Reliable and fault-tolerant distributed systems have been attracting more and more attention (see Autonomic Computing Project by IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/autonomic/). A self-stabilizing protocol is a fault-tolerant protocol that guarantees autonomous recovery from any number of and any type of faults that can affect the data stored locally at some process(es). If the impact of the faults can be contained to the affected process(es) and some of its immediate neighbors, then the protocol is also fault-containing. We present a new method, called causal simulation, which preserves the fault-containing property of ring protocols executed on trees.
INTRODUCTION
A distributed system consists of processes that communicate with each other by communication links. Faults can change the memory content of some processes to arbitrary values. Given communication among processes, they can contaminate a distributed system. Many fault-tolerant distributed protocols have been proposed, which contain the effect of faults and provide rapid recovery from faults. Self-stabilizing protocols guarantee autonomous recovery of finite time against any finite number of faults.
As one of the most investigated networks in distributed computing, a ring network is frequently used for distributed computation and control. Dijkstra designed the first selfstabilizing protocols for ring networks (three mutual exclusion protocols in [1] ). The election problem, one of the most fundamental problems, was first introduced by Lelann for ring networks [2] . A substantial advantage of ring protocols is that they can be applied to arbitrary networks by means of virtual rings embedded on real networks. The most desirable ring embedding is the one along a Hamiltonian cycle of the real network, but finding a Hamiltonian cycle is computationally intractable.
One way to embed a ring on an arbitrary network is to embed it in a spanning tree of the network. Commonly used ring embeddings on a tree are the Euler tour [3] (Fig. 1(a) ), the one proposed by Sekanina [4, 5] (Fig. 1(b) ), and an embedding similar to Sekanina's, proposed by Arora et al. [6] . We observe that adjacent processes in the tree remain adjacent in the Euler tour, but not in Sekanina's or Arora's ring embeddings; Sekanina's and Arora's embeddings have a dilation (the maximum distance in the tree between consecutive processes in the ring) of three. Also, each process in the tree corresponds to a single process in the ring in Sekanina's and Arora's embeddings, while in the Euler tour a process in the tree is duplicated a number of times equal to its degree. Thus for a tree with n processes, the length of the ring based on the Euler tour is 2n 2 2, respectively, n for Sekanina's and Arora's ring embeddings.
Fault-containment is one of the most fundamental paradigms for designing reliable and fault-tolerant distributed protocols. A fault-containing protocol guarantees recovery from faults at a cost (e.g. time, the number of non-faulty processes affected and the number of actions executed) proportional to the number of faults or the maximum possible number of faults; in other words, the effect of the fault is contained to the process and/or some of its neighbors. Many faultcontaining protocols have been proposed; most of them are obtained by adding the property of fault-containment to already existent self-stabilizing protocols. Ghosh et al. present a general technique for adding the fault-containment property to non-reactive self-stabilizing protocols [7] . Many fault-containing protocols are designed for the locally shared memory model [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . A single fault is contained and rapid recovery is guaranteed in the fault-containing protocols for rings [8, 9] where leader election [8] or token circulation [9] is solved; for arbitrary trees [10] where median finding is solved; and for general graphs [7, [11] [12] [13] , where breadth-first THE COMPUTER JOURNAL, 2008 search trees [11] , spanning trees [12] and maximal independent sets [13] are built efficiently.
Another effective way of designing fault-containing protocols is to apply existing ones, designed for simple networks (e.g. rings), to arbitrary networks. This approach is common in protocol design. However, it involves the difficulty described below when applied to fault-containing protocols. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, this approach has not been investigated in the context of fault-containment. Thus, our paper presents the first step in extending a faultcontaining ring protocol to an arbitrary network.
Euler tour embedding cannot preserve the faultcontainment property of ring protocols. This impossibility is due to the fact that a tree process appears in the Euler ring several times: a faulty process in the tree must be treated as multiple faults in the ring. The number of faults in the ring may exceed the maximum number of faults that the faultcontaining ring protocol can tolerate. Or, the recovery cost becomes proportional to the maximum degree of processes involved. Sekanina's embedding is the first step in preserving fault-containment of a ring protocol in a tree. The one-to-one node embedding ensures that a fault that affects a single process in the tree can be treated as a single faulty process in the ring. However, this embedding alone cannot ensure fault-containment completely because the links of the ring go through some intermediate process(es) that can be corrupted by a fault, thus corrupting the ring communication.
Contributions. This paper presents causal simulation, a method for applying ring protocols to rooted trees, which preserves the fault-containment property.
The dilation of Sekanina's embedding is three: thus neighboring processes in the virtual ring are not necessarily neighboring processes in the tree. In addition, any process p, of degree d p , is an intermediate process for d p 2 1 embedded ring links. Thus, a single fault at process p can affect communication for d p virtual links of Sekanina's embedding that pass through p.
If a ring protocol is fault-contained, this property should be preserved when the ring protocol is executed on a ring embedded on another topology, for example, on a tree. Since in Sekanina's embedding the dilation is three, an embedded link has at most two intermediate processes that can be corrupted by a fault.
We use a communication synchronizer among neighboring processes so that for each data to be routed at most two corrupted pieces of the data are read at the endpoint process. We force each piece of data to be relayed five times and the endpoint process to apply the computation of the majority on them. Because there are at most two corrupted pieces of data in each set of five pieces of data, the corrupted data are removed at the endpoint process. Repeating the communication five times before delivering the data causes a slowdown in executing the ring protocol in the tree, but overall the slowdown of the ring protocol is proportional to the maximum degree of the tree.
Causal simulation is a weaker notion than simulation, defined by Lynch [14] over the set of configurations of two different protocols. But it is strong enough to guarantee that the simulating protocol can execute the same task as the original protocol. Lynch defined the simulation relation between two different protocols: it requires that one protocol trace every global configuration of the other protocol [14] . In our ring embedding, it is difficult to simulate the global configurations of the original ring protocol because virtual links may have different communication delays. However, our method preserves the read/write causality of original protocols, which leads us to call our method causal simulation. Causal simulation guarantees a simulation of ring protocols for nonreactive (e.g. leader election, etc.) and reactive tasks (e.g. token circulation, etc.) such that the safety property of the task depends on the read/write causality. Since most of the reactive protocols are based on read/write causality, causal simulation can be applied to a variety of protocols.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to develop a method that simulates a protocol into another topology while preserving the property of fault-containment. Using the fault-containment-preserving composition of Yamauchi et al. [10] and some fault-containing spanning tree, our method can be extended to arbitrary networks. Consequently, this work pioneers a new methodology of designing fault-containing protocols on arbitrary networks. Outline. In Section 2 we present some basic notions and the vertex bijective ring. In Section 3 we introduce the notion of causal simulation. In Section 4 we present the protocol RET that provides a causal simulation of ring protocols by simulating the communication link on the vertex bijective ring. In Section 5 we show how the protocol RET can be used to design a one-fault-containing leader election protocol in arbitrary trees. We conclude in Section 6.
PRELIMINARY
A distributed system is represented by a undirected graph G ¼ (V, E) where V is a set of processes and E is a set of bidirectional communication links. Each process has a unique identity. Process p is a neighbor of process q iff there exists a bidirectional communication link between p and q, denoted by (p, q). Each process changes its state by executing a protocol that is a finite set of guarded actions of the form kguardl ! kstatementl, where kguardl is a Boolean predicate that involves the process variables and the variables of its neighbors, and kstatementl is an assignment that changes the value of the process variables. If an action has its guard evaluated to true then it is called enabled, otherwise disabled. A process with at least one enabled guard is called enabled.
As a scheduler, we adopt the distributed daemon: in a computation step, a non-empty subset of enabled processes is selected to execute their actions. Each selected process executes one of its enabled actions. The guard evaluation and the execution of the corresponding action are considered to be done in one atomic step. We consider the distributed daemon is weakly fair, that is, if a process evaluates some of its guards to be true infinitely often, the process is selected by the distributed daemon infinitely often. An execution of a protocol is an infinite sequence of configurations E ¼ s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . such that s iþ1 is either the final configuration or is obtained from s i by applying one computation step. A distributed scheduler allows asynchronous execution.
In an asynchronous execution, time is measured by computation steps or rounds. Let s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . be an asynchronous execution. The first round s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s i is the minimal prefix of the execution such that for each process p [ V, either p's guard is disabled at some configuration of the prefix or p executes at least one step in s 0 , . . . , s i . The second and latter rounds are defined recursively by applying the definition of the first round to the remaining suffix of the execution s iþ1 , s iþ2 , . . . .
A problem (task) T is specified by a legitimate predicate P T on configurations. A configuration s is legitimate iff any configuration that appears in any execution starting from s satisfies the legitimate predicate. A self-stabilizing protocol for T eventually reaches a legitimate configuration defined by P T from an arbitrary initial configuration and remains in legitimate configurations thereafter.
A transient fault can change the values of some processes' variables (their states) to arbitrary ones. In that case, we consider that a process has executed a faulty action and the process is called faulty. A self-stabilizing protocol is resilient to any number of transient faults because it reaches a legitimate configuration from any faulty configuration.
An f-fault-containing protocol not only guarantees selfstabilization but also guarantees that if a transient fault corrupts (at most) f processes in a legitimate configuration, in O(f) steps (or rounds), the system reaches a legitimate configuration with at most O(f) processes around faulty processes that change their states during the recovery.
We embed a vertex bijective ring on a rooted tree and simulate a fault-containing ring protocol on the embedded ring. DEFINITION 1. Vertex bijective ring LF. Given a tree T ¼ (V, E), a vertex bijective ring of T is any ring R ¼ (V, E 0 ) embedded on T such that each process of tree T appears only once on the ring R.
The processes and the links of a vertex bijective ring R are called virtual, and the processes and the links of T are called real. The dilation of R in T is the maximum distance in T between any neighboring processes in R.
Sekanina's ring embedding [4] is an example of a vertex bijective ring of a tree with dilation of three. It can be described as a preorder -postorder traversal of the tree. Given a tree T ¼ (V, E) rooted at process r, the processes in T are divided into even-and odd-level processes such that: (i) the root is at even level and (ii) a process is at odd (even) level iff its parent is at even (odd) level. The preorder -postorder traversal starts with the root process r, then continues along a depth-first traversal. A process p [ V is deployed on the virtual ring as follows. If p's level is even, p is deployed as a preorder traversal, that is, p is deployed on the ring before all its descendants in the tree. If p's level is odd, p is deployed as a postorder traversal, that is, p is deployed on the ring after all its descendants.
Two adjacent processes in a preorder-postorder traversal are connected by a virtual link. To form a ring, a virtual link is added between the last visited process and the root process r. The preorder-postorder traversal for a given tree topology is shown in Fig. 2(a) . The obtained ring is shown in Fig. 2(b) . Process a (the root of the tree T) is deployed first. The successor of a in the traversal is e because b's level is odd and the next preorder process is e. Process e, whose level is even, is deployed for the ring before e's descendants (processes i, j and k) are deployed. Process b, whose level is odd, is selected for the ring after its descendants (processes e, i, j, k and f) are deployed.
Figure 2(c) shows the virtual links of the embedded ring presented in Fig 2(b) . Each virtual link is a path of at most three real (tree) links (e.g. a virtual link (b, g) is a path (b, a, c, g) in the tree).
CAUSAL SIMULATION
In this section, we give a formal definition of causal simulation. We first introduce the causal simulation of a fault-free and non-stabilizing case, then we progress into a self-stabilizing case and a fault-containing case. The idea of causal simulation of protocol P v designed for topology T v is that a protocol P r designed for topology T r executes the same task as P v .
We now define what it means that one protocol P r defined for topology T r provides a causal simulation of another protocol P v defined for topology T v , both using a locally shared memory model. Besides the variables of P v , a process in P r may have another set of variables. The variables that are common to P v and P r are called common and the rest are called non-common. Thus, the projection of a process state in P r on to its common variables represents its state in P v . Given an execution E r of P r , this projection defines the behavior in P v . R(E r ) represents the execution in P v obtained by the projection of E r and removing some stuttering configurations in it. Causal simulation guarantees that any execution E r of P r has a corresponding execution E v of P v such that we can obtain R(E r ) by a shift operation on time -space diagram of E v . We call this shift operation causal shift since the operation preserves the read/write causality of the original execution in a sense that any data read was written before.
Generally, when executing a self-stabilizing protocol or a fault-containing protocol, a process may write the same value on one register repeatedly. For example, let a process write a value a to one register three times. We consider this as write actions of three different data: e.g. a (1) , a (2) and a (3) are written in the register successively. Causal shift should preserve the read/write causality for each a (1) , a (2) and a (3) . DEFINITION 2. Causal shift LF. Given an infinite execution E v of P v , a causal shift modifies the time-space diagram of E v as follows: (i) shift states on the temporal lines of processes, but keep each write event of some data precedent to any read event of that data and (ii) add some copies of the initial state of a process as the first states of the process so that the initial states of all processes are aligned.
The time -space diagram obtained from the execution of E v by causal shift represents a sequence of configurations denoted by E vjcs . E vjcs is not uniquely defined by E v . Figure 3 shows an example of a causal shift where we focus on the read/write causality of the data a that is written to the register at process p and after that it is read by one of p's neighbors, q. Process q changes its state from c to d according to the data a ( Fig. 3(a) ). Because causal shift should preserve that the data read should always be written before, we can shift the states at q towards the right of the temporal line of process p. Let the operation (i) of causal shift move the temporal line of q as shown in Fig. 3(b) . Then, the first state c of q is copied and the initial states of p and q are aligned. The sequence of configuration obtained from P v is shown in Fig. 3 (c). Causal shift does not violate the read/write causality of the original execution.
We say two states s p of process p and s q of process q (p = q) are concurrent in an execution iff s p and s q have no relation in the sense of read/write causality. From Definition 2, the following remark follows immediately. Any configuration sequence obtained by a causal shift from an execution denotes another execution in an asynchronous message-passing system. However, in locally shared memory model, E vjcs does not necessarily denote an execution. For example, in Fig. 3(c) , the process q cannot read a when the state of p is b. Causal simulation is weaker than the simulation relation defined by Lynch [14] . Lynch defined a simulation relation between two protocols such that for any execution of one protocol, every computation step is traced by the other protocol. This means that every global configuration of the original protocol appears in the simulation protocol. Causal simulation does not trace global configurations of original executions but preserves the local behavior of each process and the read/write causality. This is sufficient for many problems such that the legitimacy of the problem is defined by the read/write causality: e.g. leader election problem, spanning tree construction problem token circulation problem, and so on. DEFINITION 3. Causal simulation of fault-free non-stabilizing protocols LF. A protocol P r defined for a topology T r provides a causal simulation of another protocol P v defined for a topology T v (with the same process set as T r ) on a locally shared memory model iff for any infinite execution E r of P r , there exists an infinite execution E v of P v such that we obtain R(E r ) from E vjcs .
Starting from a predefined good initial configuration, it may be possible to provide a causal simulation of the original protocol from the initial configuration. However, self-stabilizing protocols start from an arbitrary initial configuration. We relax the restriction for a causal simulation of self-stabilizing protocols: starting from an arbitrary initial configuration, P r eventually provides the causal simulation of P v . Thus, to preserve the self-stabilization of P v , causal simulation guarantees that any execution of P r starting from an arbitrary initial configuration has a suffix whose projection on to the common variables is obtained from some causal shift of some execution of P v . We denote an infinite suffix of an infinite execution E by suff(E). DEFINITION 4. Causal simulation of fault-free self-stabilizing protocols LF. A protocol P r defined for a topology T r provides a causal simulation of another self-stabilizing protocol P v defined for a topology T v (with the same process set as T r ) on a locally shared memory model iff for any infinite execution E r of P r starting from any arbitrary initial configuration, there exists an infinite execution E v of P v such that we obtain suff(R(E r )) from E vjcs .
A configuration s r of P r is cs-legitimate iff for any execution starting from s r , the projection of it is obtained by a causal shift of some execution of P v starting from a legitimate configuration of P v . Since P r does the same task as P v , and P v is a self-stabilizing protocol, P r eventually reaches a cs-legitimate configuration. REMARK 2. Starting from any arbitrary initial configuration, P r eventually reaches a cs-legitimate configuration.
To preserve the fault-containment of P v , intuitively the following conditions should be satisfied: if E r starts with a cs-legitimate configuration s r of P r and the fault corrupts some processes in the first computation step, R(E r ) should be a suffix of a causal shift of some execution E v of P v such that all the faulty processes experience faulty actions in E v in a legitimate configuration s v at the same time in E v and the faulty actions change all the common variables in the same way as E r . If the number of faulty processes is not larger than the maximum number for which E v guarantees fault containment, E r shows the fault-containing recovery because E r provides a causal simulation of E v .
However, it is not guaranteed that the above condition holds. This is because E r is obtained by a causal shift of some execution E v of P v . A causal shift shifts states on the temporal line of processes of E v and may also shift the faulty actions in E v executed at the same time at different processes. Furthermore, a causal shift can produce a configuration of E r that may never appear in E v . For example, based on the causal shift, such execution of P r can exist (Fig. 4) . After the fault corrupts some process p, a non-faulty process q reads the data that p holds before the corruption. Thus, the projection of a global configuration just before the corruption cannot appear in P v .
Still, it is guaranteed that there is some execution E v of P v such that all faulty processes execute faulty actions in a legitimate configuration of P v and the projection of the states before and after the corruption at faulty processes is same as those in E v .
REMARK 3.
There exists an execution of P v such that all faulty processes execute faulty actions in a legitimate configuration of P v and those faulty actions change all the common variables in the same way as E r .
Proof. Consider the case in which faults corrupted two processes in a cs-legitimate configuration s r of P r . These two faults occur at processes p and q, and p (respectively, q) changes its state from s p to s Since s r is a cs-legitimate configuration of P r , the projection of s r is obtained by causal shift of some execution of P r starting from a legitimate configuration.
Let us consider fault-free executions first. From some faultfree execution, E* r ¼ s r , s rþ1 , . . . , E r is obtained by corrupting some processes after s r . Such E* r is obtained from some execution of P v starting from a legitimate configuration because s r is a cs-legitimate configuration. Let P(s r ) be a set of executions of P v from which we can obtain the projection of any execution of P r starting from s r by suff(E and R(s q ) are concurrent states, then there exists at least one execution in P(s r ) such that these two states coincide in one configuration. However, if there is no such execution in P(s r ), then there exists some read/write causality between R(s p ) and R(s q ). Thus, R(s p ) and R(s q ) are not concurrent states in P v and this conflicts with Remark 1.
Thus, there exists some execution E* v [ P(s r ) such that R(s p ) and R(s q ) coincide in a configuration s v . Because s r is a cs-legitimate configuration of P r , s v is a legitimate configuration of P v .
We considered that the number of faulty processes is two, but when the number of faulty processes is bigger than two, we can conclude in the same way.
A In E r , the fault corrupts some processes and changes the configuration from s r to s 0 r . This corresponds to that in E* v , the fault corrupts some processes and changes the configuration from s v to s 0 v . If the number of faulty processes is not larger than the maximum number of faulty processes that P v guarantees fault-containment, the execution of P v after the corruption shows a recovery of fault-containment and E r also shows the recovery of fault-containment.
When a fault corrupts some processes, the corrupted process cannot provide causal simulation immediately after the corruption. For example, common variables at a faulty process may change after the corruption because non-common variables were also corrupted by the fault. In this case, common variables may flutter and the state of that process in the projection may also flutter. However, we can ignore this repetition of fluttering states if the repetition is finite and the fluttering states do not affect other processes in the projection: any neighbor in P v does not change its state according to the fluttering states at a faulty process.
Let R 0 (E r ) be obtained from R(E r ) by replacing some local states that appear consecutively and immediately after each faulty action with the state that follows the last replaced state. R 0 (E r ) is not uniquely defined by R(E r ). Figure 5 shows an example of R 0 (E r ) where the state x at process q is replaced with the following state e.
In R 0 (E r ), the replaced states do not affect other processes in the projection while the replacing state may affect other processes in the projection. R 0 (E r ) enables the simulating protocol P r to have other variables than common variables since it may take some steps (or rounds) for P r to recover both common and non-common variables after the corruption. Clearly, Remark 2 holds when we use R 0 (E r ) instead of R(E r ).
DEFINITION 5. Causal simulation of fault-containing protocols LF. A protocol P r defined for a topology T r provides a causal simulation of another fault-containing protocol P v defined for a topology T v (with the same process set as T r ) on a locally shared memory model iff for any execution E r of P r starting from any cs-legitimate configuration where all faulty actions occur in the first step and all the other actions are correct ones, there exists an execution E v of P v such that E v starts from a legitimate configuration of P v and a fault corrupts the same processes at a time and there exists R 0 (E r ) that we obtain from suff(E vjcs ).
If P r satisfies both Definitions 4 and 5 for fault-containing self-stabilizing protocol P v , P r provides the causal simulation of P v preserving the self-stabilization property and faultcontainment property of P v .
Causal simulation preserves the behavior of each process and the read/write causality of original execution. When a fault corrupts some processes in a cs-legitimate configuration of P r , causal simulation guarantees there exists some execution of P v that experiences the corruption of the same process set at a time. Consequently, for a fault-containing selfstabilizing protocols P v , causal simulation guarantees the fault-containment property if the number of corrupted processes is smaller than or equal to the number for which P v guarantees fault-containment.
FAULT-CONTAINMENT PRESERVING CAUSAL SIMULATION PROTOCOL RET
We define protocol RET for a tree. We show that it provides a causal simulation of a unidirectional ring protocol on the tree and preserves the fault-containment of the ring protocol (Theorem 1). We embed a vertex bijective ring on a tree. Our local routing function is similar to Arora's paper [6] . Each process p is part of the data in d p virtual links and maintains a local routing function f p (). For q [ N p < fpg, f p (q) returns some process in N p or p to which p relays the data from q: f p (q) ¼ r with r [ N p < fpg if p needs to forward the data from q to r. The inverse of f p (q), f p
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(q), returns p or some neighbor of p from which p should relay to q:
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(ii) For a non-root, even-level process p,
(iii) For an odd-level process p,
For process c in Fig. 2(c) ,
A virtual link of vertex bijective ring consists of at most three (tree) links and at most two intermediate processes. These intermediate processes relay on the data between endpoints in a store-and-forward manner. We consider the case of a virtual link along which the intermediate processes are corrupted but the endpoints are not. If an endpoint is corrupted by the fault, the virtual process of that endpoint is also corrupted. If we allow the corrupted data to be read at the endpoint of the virtual link, the fault may spread in the entire system unhindered.
To prevent unlimited propagation of corrupted data from an intermediate process to an endpoint process of a virtual link, we synchronize the communication of a process with its immediate neighbors. Between two consecutive communications of a process p with its neighbor q, we force p to communicate with all its other neighbors. To this end, we use the mechanism of link alternator [15] . There are also tree synchronizers [16, 17] , however these synchronizers are not snap-stabilizing because a faulty process can communicate twice consecutively with the same neighbor before communicating with other neighbors.
The link alternator is snap-stabilizing and ensures synchronization immediately after the fault. In the link alternator protocol, each process p has a pointer comp p indicating a process in N p . When two neighboring processes point at each other (e.g. comp p ¼ q and comp q ¼ p for some process q [ N p ), the two processes can communicate. After that they change the pointer to another neighbor. The ordering of the neighbors is determined by the topology and each process can communicate with its neighbors in a round-robin fashion. The link alternator protocol is snap-stabilizing; every configuration of the protocol is legitimate. Starting from an arbitrary initial configuration, the protocol ensures that each process can communicate with its neighbors in a round-robin fashion. Thus, in every execution, between two consecutive communications with the same neighbor, each process communicates with other neighbors.
Protocol RET
In a locally shared memory model, a process executes the following three steps: (i) reads the local variable(s) of the immediate neighbor(s), (ii) executes some local computation and (iii) writes into its own local variable(s). When process p receives five pieces of data from its predecessor in the virtual ring, p computes majority of them. The result is then delivered p, which corresponds to read action in the virtual ring. Then, p executes the computation of the original protocol and updates the common variables, which corresponds to a write action to common variables in the virtual ring.
Protocol RET (Algorithm 4.1) uses the following variables. Each process p has a variable v p used by the ring protocol. 1 Variable c p denotes the remaining number of times p should read the data from its predecessor in the ring (through possible intermediate processes) and c p takes a value in the set f0, . . . , 4g. In the original ring protocol, process p updates v p by executing a generic action called Action(). Action() has two parameters: the current content of p, v p and the data relayed from its predecessor in the ring. By default, Action(v p , ?) ¼ v p (if no data delivered p, then do nothing).
For the routed data, process p uses the variables:
(1) w p † (q), called contents table, keeps the data sent by f p 21 (q) through p that needs to be relayed to process Action A 1 simulates the ring communication on the tree. Condition f p (q) = p implies that the data read from q needs to be relayed further. When the counter c p is zero, the majority is applied (function maj) to the content of v p ‡ relayed from its predecessor in the virtual ring. If the result is not empty, we say that the result is delivered p. Then, p executes Action() and updates v p with the result. The counter c p is reset to four and the new content of v p is relayed to its successor in the ring.
Correctness proof of protocol RET
For some process p, let q and r be its predecessor and successor in the ring, respectively.
In any execution of RET, if q changes v q to s with Action(v q , maj(v p ‡ )) and no fault occurs at q during v q ¼ s, then p stores at least five s's in v p ‡ (Proposition 1). Independent of the value of c p at the time q changes v q to s, if p stores five s's in v p ‡ , then s is delivered p (Proposition 2). A configuration s of RET is a legitimate configuration iff in any execution starting from s Propositions 1 and 2 hold.
A legitimate configuration is reached in finite time once each process has reset its counter c p to four at least once (Lemma 1). The time complexity depends on the synchronizer used for communication between neighboring processes.
Since dilation is three, a fault at the intermediate processes on a virtual link may corrupt at most two pieces of data out of five, thus by applying a majority function, the corrupted data is eliminated. If neither q nor p are faulty and v q ¼ s, then either data s is delivered at p or is lost (but no other data delivered) if some fault occurs at the intermediate processes on the virtual link between q and p (Lemma 2).
The fault at p can corrupt p's variables: v p , c p , w p † and w p ‡ . Assume that the fault had changed v p from a value of s to a value of t = s, c p to some value in the set f0, . . . ,4g (Action C 1 corrects it otherwise), and the top five entries of w p ‡ are w 1 , . . . ,w 5 (Fig. 7) . The contents table w p † is correctable: the entries for all q = f p (p) in the contents table w p † will be corrected (Lemma 2). The entry w p † (f p (p)) (data that p forwards to its successor in the ring) is equal to v p (Action C 1 corrects it otherwise).
In the ring, the process p reads the contents of process q that is a value s. This corresponds in the tree that p stores five s's in v p ‡ (Proposition 1). Propositions 1 and 2 deal with fault-free cases. We show that a fault at p that occurred during this communication may affect it at most twice: Only data s and another data that p took before s may be lost, but no data before that or after s lost and the state of p in the virtual ring, v p , is corrupted at most once by the fault in the virtual ring (Lemma 3). We can then conclude that a fault may cause a loss of at most three pieces of data per virtual link (Lemma 4). Lemmas 2-4 cover all possible timings of faults for a virtual link. Then, we will show the data loss is acceptable in the causal simulation of ring protocols (Theorem 1). PROPOSITION 1. If process q changes its content v q to s by Action(v q , maj(v p ‡ )), and p is the successor of q in the virtual ring, then p stores at least five s's in v p ‡ .
Proof. Whenever the contents of q (stored in v q and w q † (f q (q))) is changed, the counter c q is reset to four. Whenever the current value of w q † (f q (q)) is read by a process f q (q), the counter is gradually decremented to zero. Each intermediate Proof. Let p and q be two processes such that p is the successor of q. After process q has reset c q to four at least once, v q changes when the process f q (q) has read the content of v q five times. Since p has reset c p to four, p applies majority once during the acquisition of s. If a fault occurred at some intermediate process(es) when p was about to collect five b's, in the worst case, instead of five b's, p will store three b's and two faulty data. Nevertheless, the corrupted data not enough for a majority, thus data b can be either delivered at p or lost (See Appendix 1 for complete proof.).
A LEMMA 3. If v q changes from a to b and the fault at p occurred after p stored five a's then data a and b may be lost, but no data relayed before a or after b is lost. The contents of p, v p , is corrupted at most once by the fault in the ring and no fictitious data is delivered at p instead of b. If data a was delivered at p before the fault, the fault at p corresponds to one of the following situations in the virtual ring:
(1) The state b of process q was not read by p and the fault at p has changed the state of p from s to t after that r reads t (Fig. 8(a) ). (2) The fault at p has changed the state of p from s to t and r reads t. Then p reads b and changes its state to x ¼ Action(t,b) that is also read by r (Fig. 8(b) ). PRESERVING THE FAULT-CONTAINMENT OF RING PROTOCOLS Page 9 of 16 (3) The state b of process q was not read by p and the fault at p has changed the state of p from s to x after that r reads x (Fig. 8(c) ). (4) The fault at p has changed the state of p from s to x and r reads x (where x ¼ Action(t,b)). Then p reads b and changes its state to y ¼ Action(x,b) that is read by r also (Fig. 8(d) ). (5) The state b of process q was not read by p and the fault at p has changed the state of p from s to z after that r reads z (where z ¼ Action(t,w) and w ¼ maj(w p ‡ ) after the fault) (Figure 8(e) (Fig. 8(f) ).
If data a is not delivered at p before the fault, data a is lost because of the fault and data b follows the same as above six situations. (See Appendix 1 for complete proof.) A LEMMA 4. If q changes v q from b to c after q changes v q from a to b and the fault at p and intermediate processes occurred after p stored five a's then data a, b and c may be lost, but no data relayed before a or after c is lost. The contents of p, v p , is corrupted at most once by the fault in the ring and no fictitious data is delivered at p.
Proof. From Lemma 2, the data relayed when the fault corrupts the intermediate processes can be lost. During the acquisition of b's at p, data b or c is relayed and can be corrupted. From Lemma 3, data a and b can be lost by the fault at p. Thus, at most three messages are lost by the fault at p and intermediate processes.
A THEOREM 1. Protocol RET provides a causal simulation of a ring protocol executed in a tree, and also preserves the selfstabilization and the fault-containment of the original ring protocol.
Proof. Let A be a protocol on a ring and v p be the local state of some process p in A. The set of local variables at p in RET consists of v p , c p , w p ‡ and w p ‡ . The condition of Definition 4 is satisfied: From Lemma 1, the system eventually reaches a configuration s such that after s Propositions 1 and 2 hold. In A, if a process p reads the state a of its predecessor q, executes local computation and writes its local variables (updates v p ), then in RET the following sequence of execution steps occurs: a is delivered at p and p executes Action(v p , a) and writes the results to v p . From Propositions 1 and 2, this always holds after s if no fault occurs.
From Lemmas 2 -4, when some fault corrupts p and intermediate processes on the virtual link toward p, at most three data relayed to p is lost and at most one data for each neighbor of p is lost. A lost data corresponds to a state of some process in the virtual ring that was not read by its successor.
Thus, we conclude that the condition of Definition 5 is satisfied. A
Performance evaluation
The execution of ring protocols in the virtual ring is slowed down because the dilation of vertex bijective ring is three and the communication synchronization mechanism for RET forces a process to communicate with its neighbors in a specific order. The slowdown of protocol P r for a simulated protocol P v is the maximum number of rounds in P r that are necessary for one read action of P v . Since the dilation is constant, we show the slowdown of RET is proportional to the maximum degree of some process in the tree.
THEOREM 2. Slowdown of RET for a ring protocol executed in a tree of maximum degree D is 8 D.
Proof. Let p and q be neighboring processes in the tree such that f p (q) ¼ p. After p communicates with q, the synchronization mechanism forces p to communicate with other neighbors than q before communicating with q again. In [15] , it is proved that starting from any arbitrary initial configuration, after D d rounds where d is the diameter of the graph, it is guaranteed that for any process p, p can communicate with its neighbor q k times in k D rounds.
One virtual link consists of at most three links of the tree. Thus, at most 3kD rounds are necessary to relay k pieces of data between endpoint processes. For one piece of data to be delivered at an endpoint process, five pieces of identical data should be relayed and the data relayed are pipelined (Fig. 9) . Thus, for one data to be relayed, (5 þ 3) D rounds are necessary and the slowdown of RET is 8D. A
AN EXAMPLE OF ONE-FAULT-CONTAINING LEADER ELECTION ON ARBITRARY TREES
We show how protocol RET can be used to design a one-fault-containing leader election protocol in arbitrary trees from the one-fault-containing leader election protocol of Ghosh and Gupta [8] on bidirectional rings. Let LE be the Ghosh and Gupta's leader election protocol that selects the node with the maximum ID as the leader. We present a causal simulation of LE on arbitrary trees that is one-fault-containing and is obtained by combining RET and LE.
We denote the predecessor of p with pre p . In LE each process p has an unique ID id p , and other variables as follows: (1) Let q be the process with the maximum ID among all processes in V, and let K be the value of id q .
In a legitimate configuration of LE, the following conditions hold: (i) for all process p [ V, max p ¼ K and (ii) dist q ¼ 0 and for any other process p, dist p ¼ dist pre p þ 1.
LE is designed for bidirectional rings and RET for unidirectional rings. Each process p has to evaluate the guards of LE and execute the corresponding actions with the value that p has just delivered in the virtual ring. The guards of LE contain the state of p's predecessor and successor. However, when process p executes Action() with RET þ , p has delivered the data just from its predecessor.
To evaluate and execute the guarded actions of LE with the latest data that p has just delivered from its predecessor and successor, we divide LE into two distinct set of guarded commands, LE þ and LE
2
. The guards and actions in LE þ at process p contain just p's local variables and its predecessor's variables, whereas the guards and actions in LE 2 contain just p's local variables and its successor's variables. We obtain LE by the union of LE þ and LE Thus, BRET provides a causal simulation of LE. For example, consider the case where BRET is executed on the tree in Fig. 10(a) . The forward and the backward rings of the tree are shown in Fig. 10(b) and 10(c) . The forward ring enables each process to read its predecessor's state and the backward ring enables each process to read its successor's state. The predecessor for process a is c (Fig. 10(b) ) and the successor for a is d (Fig. 10(e) ). Clearly, not only the state of process c in the virtual ring but also the data in the contents table at c can be corrupted. Because c is on the virtual link (b,f) of the forward ring and on the virtual link (f,b) of the backward ring, processes b and f can read at most one corrupted data. This is eliminated by the majority computation at each process.
The corruption at c makes c to set q c ¼ 1 and a to set q a ¼ 1.
No other processes change their question flags. This is because each process checks the state of the predecessor first. In this case, max b = max c at process c and max c = max a at process a.
Let us concentrate on the forward ring. If the fault changes c c þ ¼ 3, then c executes BRET after it reads the content at f once. When the majority of the cache table may be different from the content at f, c may change its content with incorrect data: e.g. (2, 5, 0, 0, ?, 1). The successor of c, a reads the content (2, 5, 0, 0,?, 0) just once and the state cannot be delivered at a. Thus, (2, 5, 0, 0,?, 0) can be ignored in the causal simulation and for a, the fault seems to change the contents at c to (2, 5, 0, 0, ?, 1). After that, c corrects correct data from f and executes BRET and executes recovery actions.
CONCLUSION
We propose a protocol RET that preserves the faultcontainment of a ring protocol that is executed on a rooted tree. Our protocol ensures that along any link of a virtual ring embedded on a tree, there is no data corruption or data creation. Therefore, our protocol RET can simulate reactive and non-reactive ring protocols in which the safety property is defined by the read/write causality.
Though protocol RET is designed in the locally shared memory model, it can be extended to ring protocols written in message-passing model by considering a time-stamp to the data sent along the virtual link embedded on a tree. The time-stamp will takes integer values in the range of 1 -5. Proof. The distance between q and p must be at least two, but not more than three. Let u be the next process after q on the tree toward p: f q (q) ¼ u.
Let a be the majority at p before the first b is stored at p. Let c be the next content of v q after b.
If no fault occurs while p stores five b's, by Proposition 2 data b is delivered at p.
If u is faulty, and the fault at u affected w u † (f u (q)) such that w u † (f u (q)) = w q † (u), then data b that relayed to p from q through u is corrupted.
So, we have two cases (Fig. A1 ): Case A) The distance between q and p is two (Fig. A1(a) ).
By the communication synchronizer, after p stores a from u, u copies the correct data from q and corrects the entry in the content table. So, next time u relays to p the correct data. So, instead of the sequence b b b b b (Fig. A2(a) ), process p stores four b's and one faulty data f. We have then five cases, depending on the position of the faulty data.
(1) Process p stores f b b b b in v p ‡ (Fig. A2(b) ). If c p ¼ 2 when f is stored, then the next majority will be ?, followed by c, and b is lost. Otherwise data b is delivered at p. (Fig. A2(e) ). If c p ¼ 1 when the first b is stored, then the next majority will be ?, followed by c. Thus b is lost. Otherwise b is delivered at p. (Fig. A2(f) ). If c p ¼ 1 when the first b is stored then the next majority will be ?, followed by c. Thus b is lost. Otherwise b is delivered at p.
Case B) The distance between q and p is three (Fig. A1(b) ).
Let u and v be the intermediate processes in the tree topology, and assume that they are both faulty. After p stores a corrupted piece of data from v, v copies another corrupted piece of data from u that p also stores the next time p and v communicates. Then, u copies the correct data from q, so next time u relays to v the correct data.
So, instead of the sequence b b b b b, process p stores three b's and two consecutive faulty data f 1 and f 2 . Let c c c c c be the sequence to follow the sequence of b. We have five cases, depending on the position of the faulty data.
(1) Process p stores f 1 f 2 b b b in v p ‡ (Fig. A2(g) ). If c p [ f2, 3g when f 1 is stored, then the next majority will be ?, followed by c. Thus b is lost. Otherwise b is delivered at p. (Fig. A2(j) ). If c p [ f0, 1g when the first b is stored, then the next majority (after b's) will be ?, followed by c. Thus b is lost. Otherwise b is delivered at p. (Fig. A2(k) ). If c p [ f1, 2g when the first b is stored, then the next majority PRESERVING THE FAULT-CONTAINMENT OF RING PROTOCOLS Page 13 of 16 (2) w = ?^w = b. Then v p is changed to z ¼ Action(t, w), and r stores five z's. By Proposition 2, z is delivered at r. If 1 , n b , 5 then p will store too few b to be able for b to be the next majority at p. Thus b is lost. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed v p from s to z, and caused b to be lost (Fig. 8(e) ).
Else (n b ¼ 5) then the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, v p is changed to m ¼ Action(z, b), and r stores five m's. By Proposition 2, m is delivered at r. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed v p from s to z, but p reads b (Fig. 8(f) ). (3) w = ?^w ¼ b. Then v p is changed to x ¼ Action(t, b), and r stores five x's. By Proposition 2, x is delivered at r. If 1 , n b , 5 then p will store too few b to be able for b to be the next majority at p. Thus b is lost. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed v p from s to x, and caused b to be lost (Fig. 8(c) ).
Else (n b ¼ 5) then the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, v p is changed to y ¼ Action(x, b), and r stores five y's. By Proposition 2, y is delivered at r. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed v p from s to x, but p reads b (Fig. 8(d) ). Case c p ¼ 2. Thus r stores two t's from p.
If n b , 3 then p stores at least one b and after that p stores another data q relays after b. Let c be that data and w ¼ maj(fc, c, b, w 1 , w 2 g, 5). Based on w we have three cases.
(1) w ¼ ?. Thus v p remains unchanged (value t), and r stores five t's. By Proposition 2, t is delivered at r. The next majority will be c and v p is changed to Action(t, c). This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed v p from s to t and caused b to be lost ( Fig. 8(a) ). (2) w = ?^w ¼ b. Then v p is changed to x ¼ Action(t, b), and r stores five x's. By Proposition 2, x is delivered at r.
The next majority will be c. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed v p from s to x and caused b to be lost (Fig. 8(c) ). (3) w = ?^w = b. Then v p is changed to z ¼ Action(t, w), and r stores five z's. By Proposition 2, z is delivered at r. The next majority will be c. This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed v p from s to z and caused b to be lost (Fig. 8(e) ). Else (n b ! 3) then the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, v p is changed to x ¼ Action(t, b), and r stores five x's. By Proposition 2, x is delivered at r. Since two t's is not enough to make majority at r, this corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p that changed v p from s to x, and caused b to be lost (Fig. 8(c)) . Case c p ¼ 3. Thus r stores three t's from p. Then we follow the same logic as in Case c p ¼ 2. Case c p ¼ 4. Thus r stores four t's from r. Then we follow the same logic as in Case c p ¼ 2. Case B) Data a is not delivered at p before the fault. Thus, n b ! 4. Let the fault changes v p from s 0 to t 0 . We have five cases, depending on the value of c p after the fault. Case c p ¼ 0. A majority function is applied to w p ‡ after one b is stored in v p ‡ . Let w ¼ maj(fb, w 1 , . . . ,w 4 g, 5). We have three cases, depending on the value of w:
(1) w ¼ ?. Thus v p remains unchanged (value t 0 ), and r stores five t 0 from p. By Proposition 2, data t 0 is delivered at r. Since n b ! 4, the next majority at p is b. Thus b is delivered at p, v p is changed to x 0 ¼ Action(t 0 , b), and r stores five x 0 . This corresponds in the virtual ring as a fault at process p changed v p from s 0 to t 0 , and caused a to be lost but p reads b (Fig. A3(b) ). (2) w = ?^w ¼ a. Then v p is changed to x 00 ¼ Action (t 0 , a), and r stores five x 00 . By Proposition 2, data x 00 is FIGURE A3. Fault at p in the virtual ring (data a was not delivered before the fault).
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